"Expressive Politics: A Model of Electoral Competition with Animus and Cognitive Dissonance"
(2022) (with W. Howell and M. Polborn)

Abstract

We study a model of electoral competition that incorporates both the instrumental and expressive benefits of candidate position taking. In the model, voters care about standard policy concerns as well as two expressive considerations: the psychological costs of deviating from one’s own preferred policy and the psychological benefits of antagonizing an out-group. Whereas concerns about cognitive dissonance consistently temper candidate extremism, the effects of animus are non-monotonic—exacerbating policy divisions when baseline levels are low, and triggering one candidate’s capitulation (as distinct from both candidates’ moderation) when they are high. We further show that candidates become more polarized when a government routinely fails to translate policies into law. And when policy disagreements run high and communications are siloed, candidates have incentives to stoke inter-group animosities. The findings have broad implications for our understandings of political polarization, separation of powers, an increasingly fragmented media market, and partisan sorting and representation.

"Demagogues in America: From the Revolution to the Second World War"
(2019) (with D. Bernhardt and M. Shadmehr)

Abstract

We define demagogues as anti-establishment politicians who provide simplistic explanations and solutions for the people's problems. We identify two key forms of these simplistic solutions: those that ignore resource constraints and those that blame particular ethnic or cultural groups for resource shortfalls. There are two main results: (1) demagogues arise on the national stage in the form of presidential contenders in the aftermath of an economic crisis, or during the slow recovery that follows. (2) Established parties often adjust their positions toward demagogues to fend them off (e.g., FDR in the mid 1930s); and when they refuse (e.g., John Quincy Adams), demagogues win and implement far worse policies that destroy physical and social capital. We highlight how concerns for demagogues dominated the thinking of Americans in the Revolutionary Era and the Early Republic, and were a main factor behind the Constitutional Movement.

"Political Competition and the Dynamics of Parties and Candidates"
(2018)

Abstract

The paper introduces a dynamic model of electoral competition in which parties must select candidates from their current members. The chosen candidates, and the policies that they represent, determine the future party membership and thus the set of candidates that are available in future elections. This framework allows us to address a new set of questions for which existing models of political competition do not apply: (1) Do parties ``overreach,'' by trying to take advantage of a current majority to implement policies that negatively impact the parties future electoral prospects? (2) How long can parties retain majorities? (3) Under what conditions does a realignment of parties take place?

"Identifying long-term party switchers"
(2017) (with M. Polborn)

Abstract

When party positions change to create sharper contrasts on social issues, and/or less sharp differences on economic issues, then voters with socially-conservative, but economically-liberal preferences are likely to switch their support from Democrats to Republicans, and vice versa. We develop a method that identifies these switch voters, and apply it to data from the National Election Survey, to analyze the demographic characteristics and policy preferences of these two groups of "switch voters."