"Integrative Negotiation: An Economic Perspective"
(2024) (with D. Chang and I. Hwang)

Abstract

We expand the canonical bargaining framework from the economics literature to incorporate the process of integrative negotiation, a phase in negotiation that has received significant attention outside of economics. Integrative negotiation, the first stage of our model, consists of collaborative attempts of the negotiators to express their priorities and interests, and to jointly acquire information to increase surplus. The second stage corresponds to a classical bargaining problem. We show that there is complex interplay between integrative negotiation and classical bargaining, and that findings that do not incorporate integrative negotiation into the bargaining problem can be misleading.

"Political Competition and Strategic Voting in Multi-Candidate Elections"
(2024) (with D. Bernhardt and F. Squintani)

Abstract

We develop a model of strategic voting in a spatial setting with multiple candidates when voters have both expressive and instrumental concerns. The model endogenizes the strategic coordination of voters, yet is flexible enough to allow the analysis of political platform competition by policy-motivated candidates. We characterize all strategic voting equilibria in a three-candidate setting. Highlighting the utility of our approach, we analyze a setting with two mainstream and a spoiler candidate, showing that the spoiler can gain from entering, even though she has no chance of winning the election and reduces the winning probability of her preferred mainstream candidate.

"Expressive Politics: A Model of Electoral Competition with Animus and Cognitive Dissonance"
(2024) (with W. Howell and M. Polborn)

Abstract

We study a model of electoral competition that incorporates two expressive benefits of candidate position taking: the psychological costs of deviating from one's own preferred policy and the psychological benefits of antagonizing an out-group. Whereas concerns about cognitive dissonance consistently temper candidate extremism, we show, the effects of animus are non-monotonic - exacerbating policy divisions when baseline levels are low, and triggering one candidate’s capitulation (as distinct from both candidates' moderation) when they are high. We further show that when communication channels are siloed and voters are less concerned about voting for someone who represents their own policy views, candidates are especially inclined to stoke intergroup animosities. Our findings have broad implications for understandings of political polarization, partisan sorting and representation, fragmented media markets, and separation of powers.

"Demagogues in America: From the Revolution to the Second World War"
(2019) (with D. Bernhardt and M. Shadmehr)

Abstract

We define demagogues as anti-establishment politicians who provide simplistic explanations and solutions for the people's problems. We identify two key forms of these simplistic solutions: those that ignore resource constraints and those that blame particular ethnic or cultural groups for resource shortfalls. There are two main results: (1) demagogues arise on the national stage in the form of presidential contenders in the aftermath of an economic crisis, or during the slow recovery that follows. (2) Established parties often adjust their positions toward demagogues to fend them off (e.g., FDR in the mid 1930s); and when they refuse (e.g., John Quincy Adams), demagogues win and implement far worse policies that destroy physical and social capital. We highlight how concerns for demagogues dominated the thinking of Americans in the Revolutionary Era and the Early Republic, and were a main factor behind the Constitutional Movement.

"Political Competition and the Dynamics of Parties and Candidates"
(2018)

Abstract

The paper introduces a dynamic model of electoral competition in which parties must select candidates from their current members. The chosen candidates, and the policies that they represent, determine the future party membership and thus the set of candidates that are available in future elections. This framework allows us to address a new set of questions for which existing models of political competition do not apply: (1) Do parties ``overreach,'' by trying to take advantage of a current majority to implement policies that negatively impact the parties future electoral prospects? (2) How long can parties retain majorities? (3) Under what conditions does a realignment of parties take place?

"Identifying long-term party switchers"
(2017) (with M. Polborn)

Abstract

When party positions change to create sharper contrasts on social issues, and/or less sharp differences on economic issues, then voters with socially-conservative, but economically-liberal preferences are likely to switch their support from Democrats to Republicans, and vice versa. We develop a method that identifies these switch voters, and apply it to data from the National Election Survey, to analyze the demographic characteristics and policy preferences of these two groups of "switch voters."