

Name:

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**All questions must be answered on this test form!**

For each question you must show your work and (or) provide a clear argument.

All graphs must be accurate to get credit.

**Question 1** The income offer curve equation is  $2x_2/(3x_1) = 2$ , i.e.,  $x_2 = 3x_1$ . The budget line equation is  $2x_1 + x_2 = 30$ . Thus,

$$x_1 = 6, x_2 = 18$$

**Question 2** The Lagrangean is given by  $\mathcal{L} = \ln(x_1) + \ln(x_2) + \ln(300 - L) - \lambda(x_1 + 2x_2 - 10L)$ .

The first order conditions are  $1/x_1 = \lambda$ ,  $1/x_2 = 2\lambda$ ,  $1/(300 - L) = 10\lambda$ . Thus,  $x_1 = 2x_2 = 3,000 - 10L$ . Inserting this into the constraint yields  $6,000 - 20L - 10L = 0$ . Thus,

$$\text{At the optimum } L = 200$$

**Question 3** A utility function is given by  $u(x_1, x_2) = (1/4)x_1x_2^2$ . The resulting demand functions are

$$x_1(p_1, p_2, I) = \frac{I}{3p_1}, \quad x_2(p_1, p_2, I) = \frac{2I}{3p_2}.$$

Then

$$v(p_1, p_2, I) = \frac{I^3}{27p_1p_2^2}$$

To get the expenditure function, solve  $u = \frac{I^3}{27p_1p_2^2}$  for  $I$ . Thus,  $I = 3p_1^{1/3}p_2^{2/3}u^{1/3}$ .


$$e(p_1, p_2, u) = 3u^{1/3}p_1^{1/3}p_2^{2/3}$$

To get Hicksian demand for good 1 we substitute  $e(p_1, p_2, u)$  for  $I$  in the demand function for good 1, i.e.,  $h(p_1, p_2, u) = \frac{e(p_1, p_2, u)}{3p_1} = \frac{3u^{1/3}p_1^{1/3}p_2^{2/3}}{3p_1}$ .

$$h_1(p_1, p_2, u) = u^{1/3} \left( \frac{p_2}{p_1} \right)^{2/3}$$

**Question 4** The Slutsky substitution effect for goods 1 and 2 is  $\Delta^s x_1 = -4, \Delta^s x_2 = 8$

The Slutsky income effect for goods 1 and 2 is  $\Delta^I x_1 = -3, \Delta^I x_2 = -6$



**Question 5** Demand for good 1 after the tax is  $x_1 = 200/8 = 25$ . Thus,

**The government's tax revenue is 75.**

Utility after the tax is  $v(1, 4, 200) = 100$ . Thus,

**After tax utility is 100**

To get the above after tax utility at prices are  $p_1 = p_2 = 1$ , we need  $I' = e(1, 1, 100)$ . Thus,

**$I' = 100$**

**The deadweight loss of the tax is therefore -25.**

**Question 6** The person solves

$$\max_{\alpha} 28\alpha + 22(100 - \alpha) - 0.2\alpha^2.$$

Thus,  $28 - 22 - 0.4\alpha = 0$ .

**The optimal  $\alpha = 15$**

**Question 7** If the person does not start the business, then the payoff is 160,000. If the person starts the business, then the payoff is 360,000 with probability  $p$  and 40,000 with probability  $1 - p$ .

(a) Suppose the person's Bernoulli utility function is  $u(x) = \sqrt{x}$ . The expected utility of not starting the business is 400. The expected utility of starting the business is  $600p + 200(1 - p)$ . The person is indifferent if  $400 = 600p + 200(1 - p)$ . Thus,

**To start the business  $p \geq 0.5$**

(b) The expected utility of not starting the business is  $-1/160,000$ . The expected utility of starting the business is  $-(1/360,000)p - (1/40,000)(1 - p)$ . The person is indifferent if  $(1/160,000) = (1/360,000)p + (1/40,000)(1 - p)$ . Thus,

**To start the business  $p \geq 27/32 = 0.844$**

(c) Who is more risk averse? (circle the correct answer)

**The Person in (b)**

The person in (b) needs a higher success probability in order to be willing to start the project.

**Question 8**

(a) The expected utility of the lottery is  $0.1(5) + 0.2(2) + 0.5 = 1.4$ .

**The certainty equivalent of the lottery is 2.89**

(b) Now suppose that the highest payoff is  $m$  instead of 25 Dollars. Then the expected utility of the lottery is  $0.1m + 0.2(2) + 0.5 = 3$ .

**$m = 441$**